Regardless of the outcome of the upcoming December 19 presidential elections in South Korea, there will likely be changes in Seoul’s approach to North Korea. Since the shooting of South Korean tourist Park Wang-ja at Mount Kumgang in July 2008, inter-Korean exchanges have subsided, and inter-Korean tensions have been further exacerbated by the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan on March 26, 2010, the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island by North Korean artillery on November 23 of the same year, North Korea’s dispatching agents to assassinate North Korean defectors including the late Hwang Jang-yeop and “balloon launch activist” Park Sang-hak or high-ranking South Korean officials such as Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin, and North Korea’s long-range missile tests. Undoubtedly, the thawing of inter-Korean relations would depend, first and foremost, on an attitudinal change on the part of the Kim Jong-un regime, which appears keen, however, on continuing the development of its long-range missile and nuclear capabilities.

In the face of continuing persecution of North Koreans who are forcibly returned to their country of origin by China, the international community needs to reconsider how it might better work towards securing protection for North Koreans. Some may be political refugees, others ‘refugees sur place’; they may not have been refugees when they left their country but become refugees because they have a valid fear of persecution upon return.

After 17 amazing days, the London Olympics are over. For millions of people around the world who were transfixed by this unique celebration of sport and the human spirit, the afterglow of these inspiring days of competition will linger for many days to come. What stays with us are the unforgettable personal stories of courage, hope, and endurance; indeed, with the Olympics, it is often as much about the stories as the competition. However, we would do well to realize that one of the most telling stories of these Games is one we were not permitted to hear at all. Namely, the hidden, suppressed, and undeniably grim story of the athletes of North Korea.

A Chinese dissident’s recent escape from house arrest has inspired comparisons with the politically repressed of North Korea. However, there is a critical difference between the respective human rights situations of the two neighbors: while a foundation exists for the US to broach the topic of alleged abuses with China, nuclear containment is the clear priority in talks with North Korea, with other issues taking the backseat. HRNK Co-Chair Emeritus Roberta Cohen argues that “only through the broad context of security, political and economic issues [can] progress on human rights be made,” and suggests changes to the US approach to North Korea.

To celebrate the 100th anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birthday, the North Korean regime announced its goal of achieving “Kangsong Taeguk,” a “powerful and prosperous state,” by April 15, 2012.  After the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17, 2011, the North Korean regime confirmed his son, Kim Jong-un, as leader of the country. North Korea’s 2012 New Year editorial mentioned the term “Kangsong Taeguk“ only five times, while mention of Songun, North Korea’s “military first policy,” introduced by Kim Jong-il, was used fourteen.  This article explores the meaning and likelihood of North Korea’s achieving its declared goal of achieving a “powerful and prosperous state,” under circumstances defined by a highly unpredictable hereditary transmission of power.

Despite hopes, even predictions that Kim Jong Il’s death might usher in progress on human rights in North Korea, no change is yet discernible. The author provides 10 benchmarks for evaluating possible changes in North Korea in the area of human rights.

HRNK Board Member Marcus Noland explains that North Korea's economic statistics, which are regarded as state secrets by the regime, are inaccurate when calculated by outside sources such as the UN due to a lack of information. In principle, examining “mirror statistics” paints a reliable picture of economic activity; however, from mistaking one Korea for the other to the omission of certain trade partners, various errors skew results from this approach. Further compounding the challenge of reaching reliable conclusions about North Korea’s economy are the politicization of independent analyses (especially in South Korea) and the emergence of an unregulated quasi-market in the North.

HRNK Co-Chair Emeritus Andrew S. Natsios warns that, despite severe food insecurity in North Korea, continuing to offer aid as an incentive to participate in nuclear talks will be ineffective. Not only is the use of humanitarian assistance as a diplomatic weapon unsavory, but Natsios also contends that the US has unintentionally been practicing perverse diplomacy: supplying food and thereby allowing North Korea to focus on producing nuclear weapons, then convincing them (by way of the example in Libya) that surrendering them would threaten the regime’s survival.